Racism or materialism?

EDUCATION vs TRAINING

I’m suprised that the poster is suprised at the mixure of racism (“targeted marketing”), sexism (the girl rides the bus), materialism (the car is the marker of success) and, of course, the perversion of the meaning of education itself.

“Education” at IT “universities” (which are scams to begin with) like Walden, Phoenix and the rest are aimed at the low-end of the demographic with their message. Their message is that training and education are the same thing. But not so. You “train” for your job but you become “educated” for your mind.

I remember seeing an ad for one of these phony universities at the back of Harper’s Magazine. I forget the name of the place, something like Southern Los Angeles University and, by coincidence, I noted that a “professor” in the continuing education faculty at McGill was a “Ph.D. graduate” of, um, Southern Los Angeles University. I was studying for my Ph.D. at the time and resented this character. I wrote to the head of the faculty and said if he wanted proof he could find the advertisement for Southern Los Angeles University in Harper’s next to the ad for the “Penis Posters.” True story. The guy was fired. Good.

I’m not sure if Walden, Phoenix, and the rest fall into that category, but they’re close. They’re diploma mills with tens of thousands in the student body. They’re in it for one thing: money. Make no mistake.

A pleasure as always.

Cheerio!

WHAT IS RACISM? (II)

“In essence race is meaningless, it’s just a genetic disposition.” (troondon formosus, Feb. 26, 6:24PM)

But the question then arises that if race is a “genetic disposition” then how can it be “meaningless?” In other words, if one is genetically disposed to do X rather than Y, wouldn’t that mean that one’s genes, in some sense,
compel one to do X? Far from being “meaningless,” then, race and presumably its manifestation in racism, must be one of our most powerful guiding characteristics. Is this what Troon means?

According to Troon, racism is more a matter of “degree” than “racism period.” It’s not an all-or-nothing matter. But what does that mean? Is it not the case that one is either a racist or one is not? So how are the “degrees” on the scale of racism to be marked off? Troon gives the example of the IT ad directed at blacks as the “low end” of the racist scale and slavery at the high end. But is this a legitimate comparison in view of the fact that the latter has not existed, at least in America and Britain, for over two hundred years? It would seem not. Perhaps Troon can think of another “low-end” form of current racism.

In view of the fact that race is “meaningless” according to Troon he then goes on, perhaps oddly, to say that it is “inevitable because the ethnic features of somebody are one of the first things one sees.” Is race and racism simultaneously meaningless and inevitable? How does that work? But Troon might be on to something in his reference to his reference to the fact that ethnic features – I assume Troon means racial features – are the first things one sees. Egress from the dilemma may lie with – wait for it! – philosophy, specifically epistemology – which concerns how we think.

The American College Dictionary defines “think” as “to have in the mind as an idea, conception, or the like.” But what is an idea or a conception? According to the Dictionary, an idea or conception – they are equivalent terms – is a “general notion, the predicate of a (possible) judgement.” So, to translate this into Troon’s terms, those racial features which one first sees constitute just that general notion which consists of particulars in one’s past experience relating to that particular racial group. One has, at least initially, expectations of that racial group. That general notion, in other words, constitutes the predicate of a possible judgement, whether favourable or not.
But does that mean we are all racists?

It would if one were to accept Troon’s initial claim that racism is an inevitable genetic disposition. But we are rational animals. We are, hopefully, not swept away by that general notion which might form the predicate of a possible judgement. For we can reflect on that general notion, stand back from it, weigh its justification (if any) and come thereby to see the Other not simply as a mirror-reflection of that general notion, as a “stereotype,” but rather as an individual who possesses qualities which exist independently of his (or her) racial group.

A pleasure as always.

Cheerio!

THINKING ABOUT RACISM (III)

“Very nice Montrealman. Now please, repeat your answer in ebonics.” (Col. Ivan Sonofabitch, March 1, 4:13PM)

Initially I thought Ivan’s comment was, um, mildly humorous since his request seemed to be simply absurd. But then I began to think about it. WHY was the request absurd? Is there something about ebonics which precludes the articulation of philosophical or abstract thought such as I attempted in “Thinking About Racism (II)”? I think there is but, in accordance with accepted philosophical practice, reasons must be advanced to support my position.

My usual first step proved unproductive as “ebonics” was not listed in the dictionary, “The American College Dictionary” at that. This could be because it is a neologism or because it has not yet risen to the level of accepted English. I think it is the latter. But why do I think that?

As with other languages, there are distinct levels of English, both spoken and written. A powerful indicator regarding the status of ebonics, however, is that it is not written, only spoken. That is why it was not in the dictionary. There is no philological denotative reference for ebonics. In other words, ebonics has no literate meaning.

This is not a minor point since it works to exclude the entire body of reflective discourse, i.e., literature, philosophy, science, history and so on. It lacks any structured, reflective dimension. Lacking such a dimension, ebonics is a linguistic primitive. Its function is to simply point at something, whatever that might be. But the one thing it doesn’t point at is thought since ebonics possesses none. It is simply a verbal reaction to the immediate concrete particulars of experience. So that is why Montrealman was unable to satisfy Ivan’s request. It was impossible to satisfy, even in principle, since ebonics lacks any theoretical and structured thought content.

But the next question, however, is whether or not Montrealman’s critique of ebonics itself constitutes an instance of racism. In other words, is a negative assessment of a widespread practice of an identifiable racial group racist or is it simply an impartial and objective account of that practice? Perhaps Ivan would like to tackle that question. What about it? Am I a racist? Please provide reasons for your answer.

A pleasure as always.

Cheerio!

THINKING ABOUT RACISM (IV)

RSVPs

Col. Ivansonofabitch hasn’t yet gotten around to answering my question as to whether he thinks my critique of ebonics is racist and, of course, why (or why not) he happens to think so. I hope he is thinking deeply about this and will give a reflective and considered response. In the meantime there are a couple of commenters who deserve Montrealman’s attention.

: mcgaidhead, (March 3, 11:02AM)

“Why did you talk in the third person in your last post … is someone else doing your replies for you?”

An interesting question, mcgaidhead, but I can assure you that no one else is doing my replies for me. As for speaking in the third person, I sometimes feel that the depth of the thought content of Montrealman’s posts are such that
a certain respect, even deference, is appropriate even from me, Montrealman’s alter ego. It can be compared to the pope speaking “ex cathedra,” that is, in the third person mode from the Chair of St. Peter. You see, Montrealman resides at a higher level – some would say he is more “evolved” than the common run – and so, when he speaks through me I, quite naturally, slip into the third-person mode. I have been doing it for a long time, mcgaidhead. You must struggle to understand.

To be honest, mcgaidhead, I have never heard of the “New Road” or the “North Preston Vernacular” but I suppose that is because I don’t live in Halifax or its surroundings. (You might want to re-check my pseudonym, mcgaidhead.) It sounds like it might be a local variant of ebonics although, of course, it might be quite distinct. I would be extremely interested in hearing more from you about it. Do you have any examples? Are you a resident of North Preston, mcgaidhead? Do you breakdance?

I’m afraid I did not understand your last question, mcgaidhead, i.e. is “anyone trying to have this discussion viewed as a racist?” Are you referring to the question I saked Col, Ivansonofabitch or does is it restricted to the New Road Vernacular?” What do you think, mcgaidhead? Do you view those trying to have this discussion as racist? Let Montrealman know what you think.

: Xenophilia (2:17PM)

“Pretty sure he bats for the other team, McD.”

But Xeno, I thought by now even you would be cognizant of the ground rules governing any discussion with Montrealman. The principal ground rule is, of course, to provide reasons for your assertions. Sadly, you have given none. You could be right Xeno, but then you could be wrong. We will never know unless you give those reasons. Reflect on your assertion and bring your reasons forward Xeno, together, where possible, with examples. You mustn’t let the readers down.

A pleasure as always.

Cheerio!

THINKING ABOUT RACISM (V)

“lan-guage, n. any set or system of symbols as used in a more or less uniform fashion by a number of people who are thus enabled to communicate intelligibly with each other.” (The American College Dictionary)

The ACD assumes the legitimacy of what might be called a “thin” or minimal definition of language, that is, any system of symbols enabling people to communicate with each other. Under that definition, of course, ebonics would count as a “language.” But does the thin definition capture the full philosophical meaning of language? Is there another, a “thick” definition of language, one not limited to the rudiments of an impersonal communication but, rather, one by which the individual comes into existence? I believe that there is and, moreover, it has an enormous importance on our reflections on ebonics in particular and racism in general.

When language is defined in its “thin” sense the obvious question is, “What is it that is being communicated?” Beyond simple reports of our sensory organs, what is communicated are ideas. But what are ideas? The “thin” account holds that they have some sort of ghostly, pre-linguistic existence in the mind and then, as the occasion requires, they are “uploaded” into language and sent off to the recipient, much as one would send a telegraph.

But the obvious question then becomes, “What would these pre-linguistic ideas look like? What would a “naked idea” look like before it was “clothed” in language?” The answer is equally obvious: “It wouldn’t look like anything at all.” This is because ideas have no independent existence apart from the language in which they are expressed. In other words, ideas are born “clothed” in language. But what, you ask, does this have to do with ebonics?

It has everything to do with ebonic since language, conceived in this “thick” sense, is definitive of who we are. We live in the world of our language. It is constitutive of our identity. In the case of ebonics-speakers, it is constitutive of their identity as well. In other words, ebonic-speakers and non-ebonics-speakers are fundamentally different people.

But I’ve said enough for now. I will return to my initial definition of racism (Feb. 26, 8:58AM) to attempt to explore just how they are “different people” and just what, if any, are the implications for racism.

A pleasure as always.

Cheerio!

THINKING ABOUT RACISM (VI)

RSVP

:Xenophilia (March 4, 6:09PM)

Ah, as I suspected, Xeno has wriggled out of my request for evidence in support of her claim that I “bat for the other team” by appealing to a quotation from – can you believe it? – Jane Austin! Montrealman, of course, has no difficulty in dismissing the ploy.

For Jane Austin, in the present case at least, was only half right for it is you, Xeno, but not me who is justified in having reason to fear that your sketch of my character at the present moment would reflect no credit. You do understand that, don’t you, Xeno? In any case, Xeno, Montrealman doesn’t read fiction, Jane Austin or otherwise, and he suggests that you might be well advised to follow his lead in this regard.

More importantly, Xeno, you have interrupted my plan to write the final chapter, as promised at the end of my last post (March 4, 9:30AM), to bring my magisterial “Thinking About Racism” to its triumphal conclusion. There are many disappointed readers out there who will not thank you, Xeno.

Give Aesop my best.

A pleasure as always.

Cheerio!

THINKING ABOUT RACISM (VII)

RSVPs

Wouldn’t you know it? Just returned to conclude my masterful account, “Thinking About Racism,” when two more enfeebled commenters pop up. At this rate we’ll never be in possession of the masterpiece. Oh well, who’s first?

: Xenophilia (March 5, 10:09AM)

Not Xenophilia again! What a glutton for punishment! Incoherently, Xeno writes that “as a philosopher” I should not have written “many people” but rather “a number of people.” Of course, even Xeno should realize that there is no logical connection between the two terms of the assertion. You do understand that, don’t you Xeno? (Nod your head slowly to indicate that you do.) It seems to me that an elementary course in logical reasoning might be in order. Would you agree, Xeno?(Nod your head slowly if you do.)

Remember to give my best to Aesop.

: Wheeliep (10:49 & 10:51AM)

Wheeliep had a thought and then, shortly after that, he had another one. Isn’t that interesting. Does it say anything about Wheeliep’s mind? I believe it does. To find out what, read my responses carefully.

In his first comment, Wheeliep yobbers on about there being only one reader of my “Thinking About Racism” – me. But how can that be when, in addition to Xeno who posted previously, Wheeliep himself must have read it in order to make a comment on it. I diagnose problems which go beyond the merely cognitive and extend to the neurological. Swift treatment, possibly including brain surgery, is clearly called for.

In his second comment, Wheeliep takes issue with my claim that ebonics has “no literate meaning.” (“Thinking About Racism (III),” March 3, 8:59AM.) The basis of my claim, of course, was tht the word “ebonics” was not found in the dictionary. My previous sentence made this clear: “There is no philological denotative reference for ebonics. In other words, ebonics has no literate meaning.” It seems that Wheeliep was dumbfounded by the word “literate.” God knows what he made of the phrase “philological denotative reference.”

A pleasure as always.

Cheerio!

THINKING ABOUT RACISM: POSTSCRIPT

Well, there you go. Another brilliant intellectual exercise, another philosophical triumph!

A pleasure as always.

Cheerio!

RSVP

: Xenophilia (March 7, 9:39AM)

“Continuing walking, I said to a co worker ‘One’s a number, right?'”

We’ll, dear, of course I had no intention on playing any “old philosopher’s trick” on you since, using philosophical terminology, I had no “apodictic certainty” (that means “absolutely sure”) as to the number of readers who would be disappointed by your flatulent remarks on my magisterial “Thinking About Racism.” However, I found your claim that number one is a number of considerable philosophical interest.

I hope your co-worker had a smidgen of philosophical background which would have enabled her to reply, “Remember Bishop Butler’s famous assertion, Xeno, ‘A thing is what it is, and is not another thing.'” This, of course, is simply a re-statement of Aristotle’s first Law of Logic, the “Law of Identity” (“X is X”) but it has an interesting application to the number one (or number in general for that matter), for you might want to press the issue and reply to the co-worker: “Since it lacks spatio-temporal extension, how can the number one be called a ‘thing?'”

The co worker would be put back on her heels by this since it would work to undermine any appeal to the “contrast theory of meaning,” that is, an apple is an apple because it isn’t an orange. The force of the theory, of course, depends on both the apple and orange being fruit and this, of course, would rule out her saying, “The number one is number because it isn’t a penis.” While, under certain conditions, the number one might resemnble a penis in shape, they belong to distinct classes of objects and so the appeal to the contrast theory of meaning loses all its force. Your co-worker would then admit defeat and retire.

I am glad to be of assistance here, dear, and confirm your contention that indeed, “One’s a number.” Congratulations on your philosophical acumen.

A pleasure as always.

Cheerio!