Your investigation of how the sewage plant broke was an interesting
read.
The criticisms over a one-step design/build contract versus a more
common two-step design-then-construct process were not fair, as each
method has its strengths and weaknesses.
Proponents and detractors of each method exist with no side being
able to claim that it is a paragon of excellence. It should be pointed
out that municipal representatives would have been able to review,
comment and ask for changes in the design. This would have been
documented and come at a price, but it was obviously not a serious
enough concern of HRM.
Stating that the safety controls on the generators should not have
shut down the machinery in the event of an overload is a reckless
conclusion. Safety controls are intended not only to protect the
machinery, but also lives—the failure due to overloading this type of
equipment can lead to catastrophic consequences far worse than a
flooded sewage plant. It is just plain wrong to compare a sewage pump
application to generators for fire systems. Codes and standards for
fire safety are quite different from their industrial cousins and it is
a mistake to suggest that the designers may have made an error in
judgment.
The word “error” should have been used more cautiously by Mr.
Bousquet; however, he and The Coast must be commended for lifting the
web of secrecy on the events of January 14, and the ensuing shitstorm.
—Red Mann, Halifax
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How the sewage plant broke
This article appears in Aug 20-26, 2009.